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1. Scope of thePaper
Ti purpose of this paper is to estimate the impact of unionism on
relative (percentage) wage differentials among industries in the United
States. The estimates are based chiefly on evidence obtained from
earlier studies of unionism and wage differentials.
The effect of unionism on the interindustrial relative wage structure
at any date consists of a set of numbers, one number for each detailed
industry in the United States.1 Estimation of these numbers for each
industry at each of several dates in the last three or four decades is an
enormous undertaking, only a small part of which has been completed
in research done to date. Nevertheless this research does provide
evidence for estimating some of the global characteristics of the com-
plete set of numbers for all industries in this period. This paper con-
siders mainly these global numbers rather than estimates of the effects
of unionism on relative wages of particular industries.
Let tvtbethe weighted geometric mean wage observed in a par-
ticular industry at date t in the presence of unionism; wotisthe
weighted geometric mean, with the same weights as in Wt,2thatwould
1ifthere are n industries, there are only (n-i) independent numbers in the set,
since the all-industry average effect of unionism on relative wages is always zero.
2Bothwsandw,,areweighted geometric means of the wages of the various
grades of labor employed in the industry, with the same set of weights in w,asin
we,.Therelative weight for each grade is the ratio of the aggregate compensation
per unit period of time of employees in the grade to the total compensation per
unit period of time of all employees in the industry, the compensation ratios being
calculated in the presence of unionism. (The compensation data that are directly
available in historical records are those in the presence of unionism.)
If the aggregate production function in the industry were a Cobb-Douglas
function of the rates of employment of the various grades of labor and other produc-
tive services and were independent of unionism, then the set of relative compensa-
tion weights would be the same in the presence of unionism as in its absence and
the ratio of w,tow0, would be the "true" index of the effect of unionism on the
absolute level of wages in the industry. In the more general case in which the
elasticities of substitution among the productive services are not unity, the rela-
tive compensation weights in the presence of unionism will differ from those in
the absence of unionism and w,/wo, may be a biased index of the effect of
unionism on the wages of the industry.
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have been observed in the absence of unionism. (The total effect of
unionism on the average wage of an industry consists of the direct
effect of any unionism that is present in the industry and the indirect
effect of unionism present elsewhere in the economy. Thus the "union-
ism" that I refer to in the expression "in the presence of unionism" is
all of the unionism present in the economy. Similarly "in the absence
of unionism" means "in the absence of any unionism in the economy.")
The all-industry counterparts of wt and wot are i-3t and ot respectively.
The industry's relative wage in the presence of unionism is Vt =
Wt/Wt and in the absence of unionism is Vot = W0t/W0t. The weighted
all-industry geometric mean relative wage is unity both in the presence
of unionism and in its absence.
The index of the effect of unionism on the relative wage of the in-
dustry is L = Vt/Vot.8 The weighted all-industry geometric mean of the
i's is always unity.
What I seek to estimate are two different aspects of the differences
among industries in the relative wage effects of unionism:
1. The dispersion (standard deviation) among industries at various
dates of the i's: a. (Here and elsewhere in this paper the symbol o.
denotes the standard deviation of the variable indicated in the sub-
script.) Because the i's are ratios, it is sometimes simpler analytically
to deal with the logarithms of the I's, than with their absolute values.
For values of I close to unity there is little difference between (1-1)
and the natural logarithm of I. (For example, log 1.25 = 0.228.) Thus
for values of gj of the size of those estimated in this paper, tTJ =T1ogI.
In defining relative wages I have not distinguished between relative money
wages and relative real wages. The effects of unionism on relative money wages
are the same as the effects of unionism on relative real wages only if the effects
of unionism on the cost of living of employees in different industries are the same
for all industries. I assume that any differences among industries in the effects of
unionism on the cost of living of their employees are negligible and, therefore,
interpret the relative wage findings of this paper as applying equaJly to relative
money wages and relative real wages.
Let A = w,/wo, be the index of the effect of unionism on the absolute (money
or real as the case may be) wage level of a particular industry. The weighted
all-industry geometric mean of the A's is the index of the effect of unionism on
the general wage level, it follows from these definitions and that of L that ii
A,/X.Thus the indexes I of the effects of unionism on relative wages can be
deduced from the set of indexes A of the effects of unionism on absolute wages.
The converse proposition, however, does not hold—the effects of unionism on
absolute wages cannot be deduced from the effects of unionism on relative wages.
Of course, if unionism has no effect on the general wage level, then 1, = A,. How-
ever, not even the algebraic sign of (X —1)can be deduced from knowledge
only of the relative wage effects of unionism.
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2. The effect of 'unionism on the relative dispersion of wages among
industries at various dates as measured by D= (ologVt—Clog
Thestandard deviation oj directly measures the extent to which the
relative wage effects of unionism differ among industries. Furthermore,
it is likely that the larger is this standard deviation, the larger is the
impact of unionism on the distribution of employment and output
among industries—the resource allocation effect of unionism.
If o is not zero, the effect D of unionism on relative wage dispersion
among industries must be positive unless the relative wage effects of
unionism are sufficiently negatively correlated among industries with
their relative wages. There is rather strong evidence that this corre-
lation is positive (though less than unity) rather than negative and,
therefore, that
(1) O<D<uiogj.
If estimates of I and of v were available for one or more dates for a
random sample of detailed industries, then both u and D could be
estimated for these dates from such sample data. Unfortunately, the
numbers that emerge from presently available studies of unionism and
wage differentials rarely are estimates of I by detailed industry and
date. The sample of such estimates provided by the studies is both
small and nonrandom. Therefore, I have used a less direct approach.
The relative wage effect estimates that may be drawn from the
empirical literature on unionism and wage differentials in numerous
instances are for categories that are not industries. Hence in this and
the following paragraph interpret the index I as pertaining to any
category of the labor force. Let p be the ratio in the category of the
total employee compensation of union labor—labor covered by col-
lective bargaining arrangements—to the total compensation of all labor.
I term p the "extent of unionism" of the category. I denote the extent
of unionism in the labor force as a whole by j,. The quantity Up —
isthe excess extent of unionism of the category. The all-category
average of the U's is zero.
The numbers that I have derived from the studies of unions and
wage differentials are of two similar types:
A. For a pair of categories (denoted by subscripts 1 and 2) the
logarithmic or percentage difference in the relative wage effects of




B. For more than two categories the regression coefficientamong
thecategories of log I (or 1) on p. The dimension of the regression
coefficient also is in per cent per percentage point difference in extent
of unionism. Indeed, the type A numbers are similar regression co-
efficients in the two-category case.
Return now to the distribution of the relative wage effects of union-
ism among industries. Let /3denotethe regression coefficient of log I
(or I) on p among all industries. Then,
(2) IogI=13U+A,
where A is the residual from the regression. It follows from equation
(2) that
(3) 2iog i 1320•p2+2.
Ihave gauged theorder of magnitude of /3fromthe typeA and B
numbers derived from the earlier studies. I have estimated the standard
deviation of extent of unionism among industries for the late 1920's
and the 1950's from a wide variety of data, chiefly those on union
membership and employment by industry.
It follows from equation (3) that f3o, cannot exceed 0iog .(Theratio
is the simple correlation coefficient between log I and p; the
correlation between these two variables among industries surely is
considerab]y less than unity.) Thus I regard my estimates of f3 as
underestimates of the corresponding values of Ologi.
It is much more difficult to estimate the residual variance Fora
few industries, all relatively highly unionized, I have been able to
derive estimates of the index I. For these industries I have used equa-
tion (2) to calculate approximations of A from the estimates of I, U, and
/3. The standard deviation of these residuals is a crude estimate of o
I turn now to the problem of estimating the effect of unionism on
relative wage dispersion among industries as measured by D = 0og
Ulog.Dmay be approximated from the inequality DI<1og .More
precise estimation of D requires knowledge of the correlation between
relative wages and the relative wage effects of unionism among indus-
tries. Since log I = log v —logv0,
(4) = v+ O1og—2r71og v0log I
where r1 is the simple correlation between log I and log v.
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Data are available for estimating the correlation between relative
wages, v, and extent of unionism, p. In estimating D in section 4, I have
assumed that r15 =
2. Summarg of the Relative Wage Effect Estimates Derived
from Earlier Studies
Our knowledge of the relative wage impact of unionism in the United
States stems almost entirely from research reported in the last decade
and a half. Before World War II there were, to be sure, many serious
studies of wages and of unionism containing statements regarding the
effects of unions on wage differentials. However, in none of these
studies, to the best of my knowledge, are there numerical estimates,
with supporting data, of the relative wage effects of unions. Since the
war, on the other hand, there has been an outpouring of empirical
research on unions and wage differentials. Table 1 summarizes the
estimates of the relative wage effects of unionism which I have drawn
from this research.'
The effect of unionism on the relative wage differential between a
pair of industries cannot be estimated simply from: the percentage
difference between the two industries in their average hourly or weekly
earnings or compensation or similar measure of average wages and
the difference between the two industries in extent of unionism. The
gross (unadjusted)differentials among industries in the common
measures of average wages reflect not only effects of unionism but also
the effects of differences among industries in:
1. The composition of their working forces by such characteristics
as skill, age, sex, race, and so on
2. The distribution of their employment by size of community and
in the attractiveness of the work and working conditions they
offer employees
3. The rates of change over time of underlying demand and supply
4Inconstructing Table 1, I have endeavored to cover all the reports of empirical
research on unionism and wage differentials from which I could take directly or
compute numerical estimates of relative wage effects of unionism or of directions
of change in these effects. (The table, however, does not cover the three recent
studies mentioned below in note 6.) Unfortunately, a considerable part of the
postwar research on unions and wage differentials is available only in unpublished
papers and doctoral dissertations some of which, no doubt, are not known to me.
The table also excludes a good many published studies in which there is evidence
that unionism may have caused relative wage changes, but the evidence was of
such nature that I could not estimate the size of the wage effects.
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conditions and in the responsiveness of wages to these changes
in conditions
TABLE 1
ESTIMATES OF RELATIVE WAGE EFFECTS OF UNIONISM DERIVED FROM
EARLIER STUDIES
(in per cent per percentage point difference in extent of unionism)
Authorand Study Number
Levinson Sobotka Greenslade Lurie Rayack
Tear (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1914-18 — — 0.40 — —
1919 — <in1914 0.30 — 0.24
1920<in 1914 — 0.57 1925 —
1922>in1914 — 1.17 — 0.20
1923 — >in1919 — 1925 —
1924 — — 0.58—0.60 — 0.17
1925 — — — 0.15—0.20 —
1926 — — 0.55—0.61 — 0.21
1928 — — — — 0.30
1929> in 1922 1939 0.33—0.430.15—0.19 —
1930 — — — — 0.34
1931> in 1929> in 1929 0.45—0.48 — —
1932 — — — — 0.39
1933> in 1931 — 0.56—0.580.22—0.24 —







1941 0.17 — — — —
1944 0.09 <in 1939 <in 1939 — —
1945 0.07 — — — —
1946 0.05 — — — o.oo
1948 — — — 0.07—0.18 —
1950 — >in 1944 0.50" — —
1957 — — — 19480.00
Study Number and Author Estimated Effect and Date
6. Ross 0.08-0.09 (Jan.1945)
7. Ross and Goidner 0.04 (1946) (1946 < 1938-42)
8. Tullock <0.25 (1948-52)
9. Goldner 0.14-0.20 (1951-52)
10. Garbarino 0.15 (1940)
11. Sobotka and others 0.22-0.29 (1956)
12. Scherer 0.00 (1939); 0.06-0.10 (1948)
13. Craycraft 0.01 (1948); 0.19 (1954)
14. Bees 0.00 (1945-48); (1939 > 1945-48)
15. Rapping
16. Friedman and Kuznets
0.08-0.35 (1950's)
<0.25 (1929-34)
17. Lewis 0.00 (1948-51)
a 1949-51 average.
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COVERAGE OF THE ESTIMATES, BY STUDY
Study No. Coverage
1.1914-33: wage earners, by industry (and in some industries, by skill
level), in selected mining, construction, manufacturing, transportation,
and public utility industries.
1938-46: wage earners, by industry, in selected mining and manufacturing
industries.
2.1939: 0.25 estimate is for composite of five skilled building crafts (car-
penters, masons, painters, plasterers, plumbers), by city, in 32 large cities;
0.05 is for common construction labor, by city, in 32 large cities.
Other years: given group is skilled building craftsmen; bench-mark group
is all employees in economy.
3.Given group: production workers in bituminous coal mining.
Bench-mark group: all employees in economy.
4. Given group: unionized motormen in local transit industry.
Bench-mark group: nonunion motormen in local transit industry.
5.19 19-32: given group is unionized production workers in manufacturing
of men's and boys' suits and coats; bench-mark group is nonunion produc-
tion workers in same industry.
Other years: given group is production workers in manufacturing of men's
and boys' suits and coats; bench-mark group is all employees in economy.
6. Wage earners, by industry,inselected mining and manufacturing
industries.
7. Wage earners, by industry, in selected mining, manufacturing, transporta-
tion, and public utility industries.
8. Wage and salary employees, by industry, economy-wide.
9. Wage earners in selected occupations, by standard metropolitan area, in
39 such areas.
10. Wage earners, by industry, in selected manufacturing industries.
11.Given group: commercial airline pilots. Bench-mark group:chemical
engineers.
12.Given group: employees of year-round hotels in large cities in which these
employees were relatively highly unionized.
Bench-mark group: similar employees in large cities in which few of
these employees were unionized.
13.Barbers, by city, in 20 large cities.
14.Given group: production workers in basic steel manufacturing.
Bench-mark group: all employees in economy.
15. Given group: seamen in Atlantic coast ocean shipping.
Bench-mark group: all employees in economy.
16. Given group: nonsalaried physicians.
Bench-mark group: nonsalaried dentists.
17.Given group: civilian physicians.
Bench-mark group: civilian dentists.
STUDIES COVERED IN TABLE 1
Study No.
1.Harold M. Levinson, Unionism, Wage Trends, and income Distribution,
1914-1947, Michigan Business Studies, June 1951.
2.Stephen P. Sobotka, "The Influence of Unions on Wages and Earnings of
Labor in the Construction Industry," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Uni-
versity of Chicago, June 1952; "Union Influence on Wages: The Con-
struction Industry," Journal of Political Economy, April 1953, pp. 127-143.
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STUDIES COVERED IN TABLE 1 (concluded)
Study No.
3. Rush V. Greenslade, "The Economic Effects of Collective Bargaining in
Bituminous Coal Mining," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Chicago, December 1952.
4.Melvin Lurie, "The Measurement of the Effect of Unionization on Wages
in the Transit Industry," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Chicago, December 1958.
5.Elton Rayack, "The Effect of Unionism on Wages in the Men's Clothing
Industry,1911-1955," unpublished Ph.D.dissertation,University of
Chicago, December 1957.
6.Arthur M. Ross, "The Influence of Unionism upon Earnings," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, February 1948, pp. 263-286. This paper is Chapter
VI in his Trade Union Wage Policy, University of California Press, 1950.
7.Arthur M. Ross and William Goidner, "Forces Affecting the Inter-industry
Wage Structure," Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1950, pp. 254-
281.
8.Gordon Tullock, The Sources of Union Gains, Research Monograph 2,
The Thomas Jefferson Center for Studies in Political Economy, University
of Virginia, June 1959.
9.William Goidner, "Labor Market Factors and Skill Differentials in Wage
Rates," Proceedings of Tenth Annual Meeting of Industrial Relations
Research Association, 1958, pp. 207-2 16.
10.Joseph W. Garbarino, "A Theory of Interindustry Wage Structure Varia-
tion," Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1950, pp. 282-305.
11.Stephen Sobotka and others, "Analysis of Airline Pilot Earnings," unpub-
lished mimeographed manuscript, The Transportation Center at North-
western University, March 1958.
12.Joseph Scherer, "Collective Bargaining in Service Industries: A Study of
the Year-Round Hotels," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Chicago, August 1951; "The Union Impact on Wages: The Case of the
Year-Round Hotel Industry," Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
January 1956, pp. 213-224.
13. Joseph L. Craycraft, "A Cross-Section Analysis of the Effect of Unionism
on the Relative Earnings of Barbers," unpublished M.A. paper, University
of Chicago, Summer 1957.
14.Albert E. Rees, "The Effect of Collective Bargaining on Wage and Price
Levels in the Basic Steel and Bituminous Coal Industries, 1945-1948,"
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, September 1950;
"Postwar Wage Determination in the Basic Steel Industry," American
Economic Review, June 1951, pp. 389-404; "The Economic Impact of
Collective Bargaining in the Steel and Coal Industries during the Post-War
Period," Proceedings of the Third Annual Meeting of Industrial Relations
Research Association, 1950, pp. 203-212; Lloyd Ulman, "The Union and
Wages in Basic Steel: A Comment," American Economic Review, June
1958, pp. 408-426; Rees, "Reply," American Economic Review, June
1958, pp. 426-433.
15.Leonard Rapping, "The Impact of Unionism and Government Subsidies on
the Relative Wages of Seamen," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univer-
sity of Chicago, 1961.
16.Milton Friedman and Simon Kuznets, Income from Independent Profes-
sional Practice, New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1945,
Chapter 4.
17. H. Gregg Lewis, unpublished paper.
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Because the studies covered in Table 1 are numerous and dissimilar
in their details, I cannot provide here a study-by-study description of
either the data used in the studies or of the techniques employed
to separate the effects of unionism from those of other statistical and
economic factors. Speaking broadly, however, two different approaches
have been used to estimate the relative wage effects of unions.
1. The cross-section approach compares the average wage of a given,
usually highly unionized, category of labor at a given date with the
corresponding average wage of a less highly unionized bench-mark
group of labor. The gross wage differential between the two groups is
adjusted to eliminate the effects of some of the factors listed above
that would produce a difference in average wages between the two
groups in the absence of unionism. It is this adjusted or residual differ-
ence in average wages that is attributed to unionism.
Two difficulties arise in the use of this method. First, if the two
groups differ substantially in characteristics other than unionism, it is
often very costly, given available data, to adjust the gross wage differ-
ence more than crudely, if at all, for some of the factors other than
unionism. The residual wage difference attributed to unionism then
contains not only the effects of unionism and of the errors of measure-
ment in the underlying wage data, but also the errors of omission and
commission in adjusting the gross wage difference. Moreover, it is
likely, I think, that the errors resulting from incomplete adjustment of
the gross wage difference more frequently lead to overestimation than
to underestimation of the effect of unionism. In this paper "relative
wage effects of unionism" are the effects of unionism on the relative
wages of labor of given relative quality. If relative quality differences
between given and bench-mark groups of labor typically were un-
correlated with the true effects of unionism on the relative wage differ-
entials between the two groups, failure to adjust gross wage differences
fully for the quality differences would not lead to overestimation, on
the average, of the relative wage effects of unionism. However, union-
ism itself may cause relative quality differences that are positively
correlated with its relative wage effects.
For example, a 25 per cent greater relative wage for commercial
airline pilots than would be true in the absence of unionization of
In a forthcoming monograph, Unionism and Relative Wages in the United
States: An Empirical Inquiry, I review in detail the relevant portions of the
studies covered in Table 1 and in other respects document fully the data and
procedures underlying the estimates given in Table 1.
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these pilots, with pilot quality only loosely specified in collective bar-
gaining, probably would be accompanied by substantial increases in
the hiring standards of new pilots by the airlines. New pilots would
have to meet higher standards of physical fitness, flight training and
experience, and the like. The average quality of pilots employed thus
would rise, reducing the true relative wage effect of unionism below
25percent.
Union rules may restrain employers from taking full advantage of
collectively bargained higher relative wages to raise the average quality
of their working forces. In some cases, the rules may be so restrictive
as to cause average quality to fall. Nevertheless, I doubt that on the
average the union rules have completely prevented increases in relative
quality from taking place.
The difficulties of adjusting gross wage differences, when the given
and bench-mark groups differ considerably in their labor force char-
acteristics, provide an incentive to restrict the wage comparisons to
groups of labor that resemble each other closely except with respect
to unionism: union and nonunion employees in the same detailed
industry, occupation, locality, size of establishment, of the same sex,
race, work experience, etc. The imposition of such strong comparability
criteria, however, tends to confine the estimates of the relative wage
effects of unionism to small and highly selected samples of union and
nonunion employees, whose services may be highly substitutable in
demand. The resulting estimates of the relative wage impact of union-
ism may have little relevance for gauging the effects of unionism on
wage differentials among industries, occupations, localities, etc.
Several authors have used a variant of the cross-section method in
which more than two groups of labor differing in extent of unionism
were considered simultaneously. The variant adjusts the wages of each
of the groups for factors other than unionism and correlates the ad-
justed wages with extent of unionism to estimate the wage differential
effect of unionism per percentage point difference in extent of unionism.
The adjustment and the correlation, of course, may take place simul-
taneously in a multivariate analysis of wages, extent of unionism, and
variables reflecting factors other than unionism.
2. The time-series approach adjusts the change from a base date to
a given date in the gross wage differential between the given group
and the bench-mark group for factors other than unionism, and attri-
butes the adjusted or residual change in wage differential to the change
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in unionism from the base date to the given date. This method involves
difficulties similar to those of the cross-section method. Furthermore,
the adjusted change in the wage differential is an estimate of the level
at the given date (as well as the change in the level from the base date
to the given date) of the effect of unionism on the wage differential be-
tween the two groups only if the corresponding effect at the base date
was negligible.
There is also a variant of the time-series method comparable to that
of the cross-section method in which the adjusted changes in wages
for more than two groups of labor are correlated with the correspond-
ing changes in the extent of unionism of these groups.
Really thorough review of any of the studies covered in Table 1
would go far beyond tabulating summary numbers derived from the
study to inquiry into the accuracy and relevance of the evidence used
in the study, assembly of relevant data not brought to bear on the
findings, and critical analysis of the specific techniques used to isolate
unionism from other factors affecting wage differentials. I have not
attempted such thorough review of any of the studies covered in
Table 1. However, few of the figures in the table are precise copies of
numerical estimates made in the studies. In the first place, the statistical
work in some of the studies was not carried to the point of providing
numerical estimates of the relative wage effects of unionism. Secondly,
in some other studies the numerical estimates were not in the same
dimensions as those in Table 1. For both groups of studies I have made
the additional calculations, data permitting, required to reach numerical
estimates of the relative wage effects of unionism in per cent per per-
centage point difference in extent of unionism. Thirdly, in a number
of instances I have made alternative estimates that were prompted
by disagreements with procedures used in some of the studies or by the
ready availability now of data superior to some of those used in the
studies. Although in the main I have performed these calculations on
the data and within the analytical framework presented in each study,
the responsibility for the numbers emerging from these calculations
clearly is mine rather than that of the authors of the studies.
In interpreting Table 1, it is important to recognize that there is
some statistical dependence among the estimates from the separate
studies. The dependence among the figures for the mid-1940's derived
from the Levinson, Ross, and Ross and Goidner papers is almost per-
fect. There is also some dependence between the 1938 and 1941 esti-
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mates derived from Levinson and the 1940 estimate derived from
Garbarino. Moreover, the six studies with broad coverage (Levinson,
Ross, Ross and Coidner, Tullock, Goidner, and Garbarino), of course,
overlap in varying degree the other studies in the table.
Though I show the numbers in Table 1 to two decimal places, the
individual estimates undoubtedly contain errors that in some cases may
be quite large. Thus, though comparison of the figures for bituminous
coal mining (Greenslade, study number 8) and for the skilled building
trades (Sobotka, study number 2), for example, with other figures
in the table appears to confirm the popular view that the unions repre-
senting coal miners and skilled building craftsmen have been excep-
tionally effective in raising the relative wages of these workers, I do
not regard the evidence in the table as establishing this view conclu-
sively. Furthermore, the data in the table and in more detail in the
works underlying it are too meager, in my judgment, to settle the differ-
ences among economists regarding the comparative effectiveness of
craft and industrial unionism and the significance of degree of product
monopoly (output concentration) as a factor producing differences
in relative wage effects of unionism.
On the other hand, Table 1 does support two general empirical
findings.
L The effects of unionism on relative wages have varied substantially
from one date to another in what appears to be a systematic fashion.
The evidence is strongest for the period beginning in the late 1930's
and ending at the end of the war or shortly thereafter. Five of the seven
studies (counting the Levinson and Ross-Goidner studies as one study)
that provided data for that period show declines in the relative wage
effects of unionism from the beginning to the end of the period. There
is less information for the comparable World War I period, but what
there is points to a similar decline in relative wage effect. Both 1914-20
and 1939-48 were marked by rapid inflation of the general price level.
Furthermore, there is some evidence of decline in relative wage effects
from 1933 to 1939.
In contrast, three of the four studies that span the 1920-22 deflation
and all five of the studies covering the deflation following 1929 show
increases in the relative wage effects of unionism. Moreover, though
the period since 1948 was not one of deflation, the rate of inflation
generally was much lower than during and immediately following
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World War II, and Table 1 indicates that the relative wage effects of
unionism may have risen considerably since 1948.°
Thus the data in Table 1 suggest that unionism has tended to make
money wages of union labor somewhat rigid against movements of
the general price level in the short run. There are two reasons for
suspecting that the information in Table 1 may give an erroneous im-
pression of the amount of money wage rigidity attributable to col-
lective bargaining:
First, the wage rigidity finding rests chiefly on the data from the five
studies summarized at the top of Table 1. Part of the data in the
Levinson study (for 1933 and earlier years) consists, however, of
minimum wage rates specified in union agreements and such contract
minima probably are more rigid than wage rates actually paid in the
short run. The time series data on skilled building trades wages in
Sobotka's study (number 2) also may be defective in this respect.
Second, the adjustments of the wage data for factors that might have
produced wage rigidity in the absence of unionism, in the estimates
derived from the data in the Levinson, Sobotka building trades (except
the estimates for 1939), Greenslade, and Rayack (after 1932) studies
were crude. Hence the appearance of union money wage rigidity in
Table 1 may reflect in part errors in the estimates of the relative wage
effects of unionism.7
6Threerecent studies, not covered in Table 1, contain information, I judge
from my first reading of them, from which it may be possible to estimate the
changes since 1948 in the relative wage impact of unionism. They are:
Yossef Attiyeh, "Wage-Price Spiral versus Demand Inflation: United States, 1949-
1957," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, Dec. 1959. Harold M.
Levinson, "Postwar Movement of Prices and Wages in Manufacturing Industries,"
Study Paper No. 21, Study of Employment, Growth, and Price Levels, Joint
Economic Committee, 86th Congress, 2d sess., 1960. William G. Bowen, Wage
Behavior in the Postwar Period, Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University,
1960.
In the larger study from which I have drawn this paper I plan to make use of
the data in these three studies.
7Ihave nearly completed research in which I am attempting to estimate the
extent to which changes over time in the rate of inflation have led to changes in
the opposite direction in the relative wage effects of unionism. Let y be a measure
of the rate of inflation of money wages or prices and U the excess of the extent
of unionism of an industry over the extent of unionism in the economy as a whole.
The distinguishing feature of the statistical economic models that I have used is
that they include among the variables determining the relative wage of an industry
not only U, but also y and the product of U and y. I have fitted a variety of models
incorporating these variables to time-series data (annual, 1920-58) for two large
industry groups, one consisting of the most extensively unionized industries and
the second of almost completely nonunion industries. The results to date rather
331EFFECTS OF UNiONS
2. Throughout the last twenty-five years and very likely also in
earlier years (except those of rapid deflation), the average relative
wage effect of unionism, as measured by the coefficient /3 in per cent
per percentage point difference in extent of unionism, probably at no
time exceeded 0.25 and may have been 0.05 or less at the end of and
just following World War II.
Except for bituminous coal mining (study number 3), men's clothing
(study number 5) in 1930 and 1932, and, uncertainly, Atlantic Coast
seamen (study number 15), none of the numerical estimates in Table 1
is as large as 0.30. Furthermore, I suspect that the biases in Table 1 are
toward overestimation rather than underestimation of /3, not oniy be-
cause of inadequate control over the labor quality factor discussed in
the preceding section, but also because of bias in the coverage of
Table 1. I judge from my experience as an onlooker and, sometimes,
adviser in several of the studies covered by the table that the industries
and occupations selected for study consisted disproportionately of those
in which the relative wage effects of unionism were believed to be ex-
ceptionally large. These beliefs, of course, may have been wrong, but
if they were right, the sample of estimates in the table has an upward
bias on this account. For these reasons I put the upper limit estimate
of /3 at 0.20, except possibly during periods of rapid deflation of the
general price level.
On the other hand, it is difficult to put the central tendency of the
estimates in the table below 0.10 except in the years near the end of
World War II. Thus I estimate that, apart from periods of unusually
rapid inflation or of deflation, the average relative wage effect of
unionism, /3, was 0.10 to 0.20 per cent per percentage point difference
in extent of unionism.
8. Estimates of the Dispersion among Industries in Relative
Wage Impact of Unionism
Return now to equation (3) of section 1:
(3) i2iog i = /32cr2p+2,
where O'2logis the variance among industries in the logarithms of the
relative wage effect indexes I, a5, is the corresponding variance of extent
consistently show negative partial correlations between relative wages and Uy,
indicating that the relative wage effects of unionism (per percentage point differ-
ence in extent of unionism) have tended to move in the opposite direction to the
rate of inflation.
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of unionism, and o is the residual variance—that is, that part of cr20g i
not accounted for by dispersion among industries in extent of unionism.
In this section I estimate crp and, much more roughly, O5.
Despitethe widespread interest in unionism and collective bargain.
ing in the last half-century, there is no source to which one can turn
for the distributions by industry, with substantial industry detail, of
either the total compensation or the number of workers covered by
collective bargaining agreements in recent years. I was forced, there-
fore, to make my own estimates of extent of unionism by industry
from fragmentary information. Table 2 contains these estimates.
TABLE 2
NUMBER OF UNION WORKERS AS A PER CENT OF NUMBER OF
PERSONS ENGAGED IN PRODUCTION, BY INDUSTRY
GROUP, 1929 AND 1953
Per Cent
Industry Group 1929 1953
Farms a a
Agricultural services, forestry, and fishing a 12
Metal mining 3 68
Anthracite mining 80 75
Bituminous and other soft-coal mining 30 86
Crude petroleum and natural gas 1 13
Nonmetallic mining and quarrying 12 30
Contract construction 31 51
Food and kindred products 4 44
Tobacco manufactures 12 57
Textile-mill products 3 30
Apparel and other finished fabric products 28 52
Lumber and timber basic products 12 20
Furniture and finished lumber products 3 29
Paper and allied products 2 45
Printing, publishing, and allied industries 23 37
Chemicals and allied products a 39
Products of petroleum and coal a 67
Rubber products a 54,
Leatherand leather products 12 39
Stone, clay, and glass products 9 44
Iron and steel and their products, including ordnance 5 57
Nonferrous metals and their products 4 46
Miscellaneous manufacturing 3 18
Machinery, except electrical 13 45
Electrical machinery 12 56
Transportation equipment, except automobiles a 52
Automobiles and automobile equipment a 80





Industry Group 1929 1953
Retail trade and automobile services 1 11
Banking a a
Security and commodity dealers, brokers, and exchanges " 3
Finance, n. e. c. a a
Insurance carriers a a
Insurance agents and combination offices a 8
Real estate 2 11
Railroads 33 95
Local railways and bus lines 36 74
Highway passenger transportation, n. e. c. a 58
Highway freight transportation and warehousing 25 63
Water transportation 16 74
Air transportation a 51
Pipeline transportation a 50
Services allied to transportation 22 59
Telephone, telegraph, and related services 1 68
Radio broadcasting and television a 50
Utilities:electric and gas a 41
Local utilities and public services, n. e. c. a a
Hotels and other lodging places 2 20
Personal services 6 19
Private households a a
Commercial and trade schools, employment agencies a a
Business services, n. e. c. a a
Miscellaneous repair services and hand trades a a
Motion pictures 15 21
Other amusement and recreation 21 23
Medical and other health services a a
Legal services a a
Engineering and other professional services a 1
Educational services, n. e. c. a a
Nonprofit membership organizations a a
Federal general government, civilian 11 15
Federal government enterprises 65 79
Public education a 2
State and local general government, nonschool 1 11
State and local government enterprises a 30
SOURCE: See accompanying text.
a Less than 0.5 per cent.
n. e. c. = not elsewhere classified.
The denominators of the percentages in Table 2, except for nine
industry groups in 1953,arethe Department of Commerce estimates
of the number of persons engaged in production.8 The numerators
8 National Income, 1954 ed, supplement to Surve1j of Current Business, 1954,
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of the percentages are estimates of the number of employed persons
covered by collective bargaining arrangements. The 1929 numerators
are based on Leo Wolman's estimates of union membership by in-
dustry9 and on information obtained from union journals and proceed-
ings and studies of trade unionism in the 1920's. The 1953 numerators
were estimated from information from a wide variety of sources: un-
published tabulations of the membership of individual trade unions by
Leo Wolman and Leo Troy;1° the Bureau of Labor Statistics surveys
of trade union membership,h1 its Current Wage Development series, its
Wage Structure studies, and articles in its Monthly Labor Review;
trade union proceedings and periodicals, and correspondence with
some of the unions whose membership distributions by industry proved
most difficult to estimate; business and popular periodicals; corre-
spondence and interviews with economists who have studied unionism
in particular industries; articles and book-length studies of particular
unions and of unionism in particular industries; and such standard
statistical sources as the U.S. Census of Population and the BLS
monthly, Employment and Earnings.
I constructed Table 2 mainly in order to estimate the standard devia-
tion among the industry groups used in the table of the per cent of
workers covered by collective bargaining arrangements, rather than
to provide myself and others with data on the extent of collective
bargaining coverage in particular industries. Thus, though I believe
Table 28; U.S. income and Output, supplement to Survey of Current Business,
1958, Table VI-16.
Because of changes in industry definitions, Commerce has not published esti-
mates for the following manufacturing industries, for the years 1948 to date, that
are strictly comparable to those for 1929-47:
Lumber and timber basic productsFurniture and finished lumber products
Chemicals and allied products Products of petroleum and coal
Iron and steel and their products,Machinery, except electrical
including ordnance Electrical machinery
Miscellaneous manufacturing Nonferrous metals and their products
(The industry classification scheme followed in Table 2 is that of the Department
of Commerce in its series for 1929-47.) For the nine industry groups listed above
I have extrapolated the Commerce series for 1929-47 using data from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, the Bureau of Employment Security, and the Bureau of the
Census.
Leo Wolman, Ebb and Flow in Trade Unionism, New York, National Bureau
of Economic Research, 1936, Appendix Tables V, VII, VIII, and IX.
10LeoWolman and Leo Troy, unpublished mimeographed tables revised as of
August 1959, from a forthcoming monograph on trade union membership to be
published by NBER.
11Bureauof Labor Statistics, Bulletin Nos. 1127, 1185, 1222, and 1267.
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that the standard deviation of the 1953 figures in the table differs by less
than 5percentagepoints from the true standard deviation among the
industry groups of the per cent of workers covered by collective bar-
gaining arrangements, I suspect that some of the individual figures in
the table may err by as much as 20 percentage points.'2
The weighted (by number of persons engaged in production) stand-
ard deviations of the figures in Table 2 are 12.4 percentage points for
1929 and 24.7 percentage points for 1953. These standard deviations
differ conceptually, however, from the standard deviation, o,ofextent
of unionism among industries in two respects. First, the extent of
unionism in an industry, as I have defined this concept, is not the per
cent of total employment (number of persons engaged) covered by
collective bargaining arrangements, but the per cent of total employee
compensation going to persons covered by such arrangements. Frag-
mentary data indicate that for the economy as a whole the error on
this score is quite small. Second, the classifications in Table 2 are for
broad industry groups rather than detailed industries. There were
many hints in the materials used that there was rather large dispersion
in extent of unionism among industries within some of the industry
groups of the table, especially in the manufacturing industry division.
Since the standard deviations computed from Table 2 exclude this
within-group dispersion, I put the estimated value of i' at closer to
15 than to 12 percentage points for 1929 and nearer to 30 than 25
percentage points for 1953.
The data from which I estimated Table 2 indicate that the dispersion
of extent of unionism among industries varied little during the decade
1923-33 and from about 1945 to date. Hence I estimate that owas
approximately 15 percentage points in 1923-33, rose to about 30 per-
centage points by the end of World War II, and then stabilized at
approximately 30 points.
In the preceding section, I estimated that /3, the average relative
wage effect of unionism per percentage point difference in extent of
unionism, was approximately 0.10 to 0.20 in the latter part of the 1920's,
the late 1930's and early 1940's, and again in recent years. This range
and the estimates of a, imply that $a,, was approximately 13 to 3 per-
centage points in the late 1920's, 3 to 6 percentage points recently,
and between these two ranges in and near 1940.
12have least confidence in the figures for 1953 for the lumber, furniture, paper,
stone-clay-glass, electrical machinery, and miscellaneous manufacturing industry
groups.
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The quantity f3 is that part of the dispersion, o(or0og'), of the
relative wage effect indexes that is correlated among industries with
extent of unionism. There is much less information for calculating the
approximate value of the dispersion, ,ofthe i's that is not corre-
lated with extent of unionism. For the following six industries or
industry groups I have calculated approximate values of I and of U
(the excess of extent of unionism in the industry over extent of union-
ism in the economy) chiefly from data in the studies indicated:
Contract construction (Sobotka, study number 2, estimate of I from
1939 data)
Bituminous coal mining (Greenslade, study number 3, estimate of I
from 1949-1951 data)
Local transit (Lurie, study number 4, estimate of I from 1948 data)
Men's clothing (Rayack, study number 5, estimate of I from 1957
data)
Hotels (Scherer, study number 12, estimate of I from 1948 data)
Water transportation (Rapping, study number 15, estimate of 1 for
the 1950's).
I then calculated the residual A for each industry by means of equation
(2) in the first section of this paper, with fi set equal to 0.20. The
weighted (by number of persons engaged) standard deviation of these
residuals was close to 5 percentage points—about the same size as the
estimate of j3o-forrecent years (at a value of 13 of 0.20).
I do not hold this estimate of o in high esteem. It is based on im-
precise information for a nonranclom sample consisting of six industry
groups employing a small fraction of the labor force. On the other hand,
the estimate does suggest that the residual dispersion oisroughly
the same in size as the dispersion f3ffp correlated with extent of union-
ism, and thus that the total dispersion o, is about half again as large
as /3ITp.Iconclude that in the late 1920's the standard deviation of the
relative wage effects of unionism among industries was approximately
2 to 4 percentage points and recently about 4 to 8 percentage points.
4.Estimatesof the Effects of Unionism on Interindustrial
Relative Wage Dispersion
In the preceding section, I estimated the amount of dispersion, o
1og,amongindustries of the relative wage effects of unions. In this
section, I estimate the amount, D = 0ogv —iflog,0ofthe effect of
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unionism on relative wage dispersion among industries. Although these
two measures of the relative wage impact of unionism are related, they
are not the same. In particular, the second cannot exceed the first
numerically:DIiog i. My estimates of ui imply, therefore, that
unionism changed the amount of interindustrial relative wage dis-
persion by no more than 2 to 4 percentage points in the late 1920's and
no more than 4 to 8 percentage points recently.
Table 3 shows the standard deviation of relative average annual
full-time compensation among the industry groups (except military
and work relief) for which the Department of Commerce reports
employment and employee compensation of wage and salary em-
ployees.13 (The industry groups are the same as those in Table 2.)
TABLE 3
STANDARD DEVIATION OF RELATIVE AVERAGE ANNUAL FULL-TIME
































































SOURCE: See note 13.
13Thedata underlying Table 3 are largely from the following national income
reports of the Office of Business Economics, Dept. of Commerce: National Income,
1954, U.S. Income and Output, 1958, and Survey of Current Business, July 1959,
pp. 3-43.
For each industry group and year, I computed average annual full-time com-
pensation by dividing total employee compensation by the number of full-time
equivalent employees. The numbers in Table 3 are fixed weighted coefficients of
variation of these average annual compensation figures. The fixed weight for each
industry group is the group's average number of full-time equivalent employees
over the period 1929-57.
For the nine industry groups mentioned in note 8, Commerce employment and
employee compensation data for 1948-58 are not "strictly comparable" to those
for 1929-47. I have extended the 1929-47. series for these groups through 1958
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Throughout the whole period covered by the table the amount of
relative wage dispersion among industries was quite large.' Further-
more, only a small part of the dispersion was transitory. In general, the
industries whose relative wages were high in any one of the thirty
years also had high relative wages in the other years: the standard
deviation among the industry groups of their thirty-year average rela-
tive wages was 28.6 per cent, which is only slightly lower than the
thirty-year average (30.1 per cent) of the figures in the table. Thus
the interindustrial relative wage structure was a highly stable one
in the sense that the correlations among industries between relative
wages in one year and relative wages in another year in the period
were very high. The structure was also relatively stable in a second
sense: there is no trend to speak of in the figures in Table 3. On the
other hand, some of the short-run changes in relative wage dispersion
were large: the standard deviation rose by 5.5 percentage points from
1929 to 1932 and declined by 9.0 percentage points from 1942 to 1946.
As already noted, cr is an overestimate of the magnitude of the effect
of unionism on relative wage dispersion among industries, unless the
relative wage effects of unionism are perfectly correlated among in-
dustries with relative wages. Nevertheless, though my estimates of 01
are not negligible compared to the figures in Table 3, it is quite clear
that, unless I have badly underestimated o,thelevel of relative wage
dispersion among industries must be accounted for largely in terms
of factors other than unionism. There is some tendency for the move-
ments in the series in Table 3 to correlate positively with the changes in
relative wage effects of unionism in Table 2. Thus it is quite possible
using the national income reports data and data from the Bureaus of Employment
Security, Labor Statistics, and Census.
It was also necessary to allocate wage supplement totals for the Commerce
"general government" headings among the industry groups within these headings.
I allocated the wage supplements as follows: (1) zero wage supplements to "work
relief," (2) wage supplements to the remaining groups in proportion to their total
wages and salaries.
14Itis likely that the standard deviations in Table 3 contain some upward bias
resulting from errors of measurement in the relative wage figures from which they
were computed. On the other hand, the standard deviations surely are biased down-
ward by their exclusion of relative wage dispersion among detailed industries
within the broad industry headings used by the Department of Commerce.
The standard deviations may also be affected by differences among industries
in relative "full-time" hours worked per man per year. I suspect that in most of
the years covered by the table the standard deviation of average hourly compensa-
tion would not have differed much from the standard deviation of average annual
compensation.
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that unionism may account for an important part of the difference be-
tween the level of the series in the late 1930's and early 1940's, and
again in 1.956-58, and the level in 1929-30. The changes in relative
wage dispersion from 1929 to 1932, 1942 to 1946, and 1946 to 1958,
however, are too large to be explained mainly in terms of unionism.
For the two years, 1929 and 1953, for which I have estimated extent
of unionism for the industry groups in Table 2, I have attempted to
make more precise estimates of the effect of unionism on interindustrial
relative wage dispersion. These estimates take into account, at least
roughly, the correlation among industries between relative wages and
the relative wage effects of unionism. The procedure followed is that
discussed at the end of section 1. For each industry group in Table 2,
the estimates of relative wages v, in the presence of unionism for 1929
and 1953, are those underlying the standard deviations for those years
in Table 3. The formula used for calculating relative wages, v0, in the
absence of unionism is:
=v/(1 +Uoi/r,,)
where U is the excess of the extent of unionism p in the industry group
over the average extent of unionismin all industries. My estimates
of u and r imply that in both years the ratio ffI/Op was approximately
0.2, and this is the figure that I used in the computations. The extent
of unionism figures in Table 2 refer to all persons engaged in pro-
duction in each industry group. The relative wage estimates under-
lying Table 3, however, cover only wage and salary employees on a
full-time equivalent basis. To make the extent of unionism figures com-
parable with the relative wage figures, I multiplied each figure in
Table 2 by the ratio for the industry group and year of the number
of persons engaged in production to the number of full-time equivalent
employees.'
For 1929, the estimated standard deviation of relative wages in the
absence of unionism was 29.5 per cent, negligibly lower than the
actual dispersion, 29.6 per cent, shown in Table 3. The estimate for 1953
of the standard deviation of relative wages in the absence of unionism
was 26.4 per cent, 2.3 percentage points lower than the actual standard
deviation of 28.7 per cent. Thus though unionism apparently explains
the slightly higher level of relative wage dispersion in recent years
than in 1929-30, it can account for only a small part of the actual
15 See notes 8 and 13 for sources of these employment data.
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dispersion in relative wages during the period 1929 to 1958. Further-
more, these more precise estimates make it very likely that the large
changes in relative wage dispersion from 1929 to 1932, 1942 to 1946,
and 1946 to 1958 stemmed mostly from factors other than unionism.
5. Summary
In this paper I have brought together information from a rather
large number of studies of unionism for the purpose of estimating for
the economy as a whole (1) the extent to which unionism has affected
in different proportions the wages paid by different industries and (2)
the amount of the effect of unionism on relative wage dispersion among
industries. These estimates are easily summarized:
a. The standard deviation among industries of the percentage effects
of unionism on relative wages, I estimate, was of the order of magnitude
of 2 to 4 percentage points in the latter half of the 1920's, about 4 to 8
percentage points recently, between these two ranges in the late 1930's
and early 1940's, but may have been as low as 2 percentage points or
even lower at the end of and immediately following World War II.
The data in Tables 1 and 2 indicate that a standard deviation of relative
wage effects of unionism as large as 4 to 8 per cent surely involves for
some industries relative wage effects that, I judge, few economists
would describe as either "small" or "economically insignificant."
b. The role of unionism as a factor explaining relative wage dispersion
among industries surely was minor compared to that of factors other
than unionism. During the period 1929-58 the standard deviation of
relative wages among industries ranged from 24 to 35 per cent and
averaged 30 per cent. In 1929 the dispersion was about 30 per cent, in
1953 about 29 per cent. I estimate that in the absence of unionism
the dispersion would have been only slightly lower: by less than one-




(1) The effects of combinations of workmen, trade unions or collective
bargaining have been a persistent problem to economists from the
earliest days of the discipline in Great Britain. The many recent attempts
to measure or to estimate the magnitude of these effects is in keeping
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with the quantitative developments of our discipline. Gregg Lewis is
concerned with only one dimension of the effects of unions, that on
interindustry wage differentials. He is not concerned with the effects
of unions (or collective bargaining) on the level of wages nor with its
impact on occupational or geographical differentials or other aspects
of the structure of wages. But he does provide a useful summary and
interpretation of seventeen studies of interindustry differentials, al-
though since his paper was prepared a number of additional articles
have appeared.
(2) Lewis' general results will not surprise students of the problem.
He concludes that the relative wage effect of unionism among indus-
tries was approximately 2 to 4 percentage points in the late 1920's
and about 4 to 8 percentage points in the late 1950's; that the inter-
industry wage structure tends to be highly stable; that unionism tended
to make money wages somewhat rigid against price decreases in the
Great Depression and against price increases in the post-World War
II inflation, and that relative wage dispersion among industries must
be accounted for largely in terms of factors other than unionism.
(3) In view of the growing number of statistical studies of the impact
of unions on wages, it is unfortunate that more attention has not been
paid to a number of basic questions concerning the significance and
fruitfulness of this use of scholarly resources. There are a number of
problems with the whole line of inquiry which need to be raised, and
the present conference is an appropriate occasion.
(4) On general intellectual grounds one should suspect that it would
be well-nigh impossible to measure the specific impact on wage rates,
and more specifically, the effects on the interindustry wage structure,
of so complex an institutional change as the introduction of collective
bargaining. To separate out the independent effect of unionism from
all the other factors influencing wage-rate structures implies a higher
degree of confidence in our statistical data and methods and a simpler
view of the workings of collective bargaining than is warranted.
One must seek a reason for this persistent concern with the impact
of unionism. There appears to be no similar concern to measure the
independent effect of the corporate form of organization on industrial
prices, or the independent effects of the banking sytem or the savings
banks on the structure of interest rates. No one estimates what prices
would be or what the price structure would look like with a different
size distribution of enterprises, or with a greater or lesser degree of
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concentration in business. No one attempts to give a figure for the
effect of insurance companies or investment trusts or personal finance
companies on the structure of interest rates. The persistent concern
with the impact of unionism as an institution perhaps reflects a pre-
occupation with defending or condemning the institution as a whole.
The institution is here and is likely to stay. The factors influencing wage
structure and wage levels are a significant area of investigation, but
the institution itself is hardly to be included in equations alongside
profits, employment, productivity, the degree of competition, and other
variables.
(5) All we know about collective bargaining suggests that the most
important effects involve fundamental changes in an enterprise and
its surrounding product and labor markets. It is really not possible to
leave the enterprise and its markets alone, introduce a union, and then
see what happens to the wage structure. The introduction of unionism
typically involves a wholesale transformation. Lewis recognizes one
facet of this change when he points to changes in what he terms the
quality of the work force. But there are many more aspects to the
problem. The content of jobs and the division of one from another is
frequently altered. The method of wage payment may be changed.
The division of compensation between wage rates and fringes and
benefits is altered. Working rules change the meaning of the services
supplied. Even greater significance should be placed on the point that
virtually every determinant of wages in an enterprise and its surround-
ing markets may be altered, and often is changed, with the introduction
of collective bargaining. The physical productivity of labor including
its skill, training, and morale may be changed. The information on jobs
and the workings of the labor market may be altered. The whole in-
ternal management of an enterprise is almost certain to be drastically
altered to confront or deal with a labor organization. Aside from sub-
stitution, technology may be different. Product-market competition has
been decisively affected in many cases. It is unrealistic and improper
to pose the problem in terms of comparing wages with or without a
union, assuming all other wage-setting factors are unchanged. Col-
lective bargaining changes most of the wage-setting variables.
(6) The fashion to measure union power by the proportion of an
industry governed by collective bargaining agreements or by the pro-
portion of employees in an industry in labor unions involves some
serious difficulties. This measure does not distinguish between equally
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well-organized unions, some of whom operate in favorable markets
and others who confront unfavorable environments. Consider the dif-
ferences in wage movements in the last decade between the steel
industry and the men's clothing industry. The difficulty with the meas-
ure of union power may be most clearly seen if one considers a fully
unionized labor force; the measure then ceases to have meaning as any
index of union power to interpret the wage structure. The measure
also fails to acknowledge the difference between an initial impact of
collective bargaining and the long-term consequences, a distinction
which has been noted by many observers from Paul H. Douglas on.
Moreover, the measure constitutes an implied negation of the whole
field of union (or collective bargaining) policy making. The intellectual
problem is to explain the different policies developed by different
parties. Contrast, for example, the various policies of the coal and rail-
road unions, each equally well organized and confronted with autono-
mous decreases in demand in their product markets. There are different
effects on wages (also employment, technical change, etc.) in accord-
ance with different policies of the parties.
(7) Brief mention should be made of at least one statistical difficulty
common to these studies. The use of standard industrial classifications
of industries involves divisions of the economy that may be of little
significance for wage-setting purposes. The industrial classifications
of "stone, clay, and glass products," "products of petroleum and coal"
or "chemical and allied products," for instance, involve mixtures of
product markets and local or national wage-setting contours which are
not likely to reveal the forces determining wage rates. Wage rates are
determined in these separate contours, and ideally the wage data and
the variables thought to influence wage rates should be presented for
such contours or sectors of the economy.
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